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Abstract 
The paper provides a framework for thinking about how the question of the future of 
capitalism might be addressed. One of the problems resides in the very definition of 
capitalism and of what its defining features consist and whether we should be talking about 
‘capitalist society’ or the ‘capitalist economy’ or some kind of post-capitalist condition. 
Following Polanyi, Castoriadis, and Habermas, it is argued that capitalism and democracy 
together constitute the defining dynamics of modernity and that the resulting tensions will 
provide momentum for the main circuits of potential change. Five scenarios for looking at the 
future are discussed. These will form the main substance of the paper: varieties of capitalism, 
systemic crisis of capitalism, catastrophic collapse, low growth capitalism, post-capitalism. In 
conclusion, it is argued that there are various possibilities that can be understood in terms of 
transitions, breakdown, or transformation, but a likely future trend will be less the end of 
capitalism than the harnessing of ‘super-capitalism’ and that there are limits to the 
accumulation of capital. 
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What is the future of capitalism? Does it have a future? Indeed, we might ask does the future 
have a future? Are there alternatives to capitalism and do they have a future or will capitalism 
also devour them? It is clearly not possible to answer the question of the future of capitalism 
with the certainty that might have been possible in the nineteenth century when alternative 
scenarios of modernity were possible and when one of these prevailed for almost a century. 
Unlike in 1818, when Marx was born, today every society in the world is beholden to 
capitalism. 
The aim of the article is to provide a framework for thinking about how the question of the 
future of capitalism might be answered. One of the problems resides in the very definition of 
capitalism and of what its defining features consist. I will begin with some reflections on 
defining capitalism as a problem. This leads to a more general reflection on whether we 
should be talking about ‘capitalist society’ or the ‘capitalist economy’ or some kind of post-
capitalist condition or ‘informational society’ (see Fuchs 2013). A tentative answer to these 
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questions will lead me to discuss the extent to which capitalism, in some sense, is the 
defining condition of our time. I argue that it is not, albeit it is integral to the self-
understanding of the present, which is also animated by democracy. I argue (following 
Polanyi, Castoriadis, Habermas) that capitalism and democracy together constitute the 
defining features of the present day and that the resulting tensions will provide momentum 
for the main circuits of potential change. This is because capitalism is more than an economic 
system; it is deeply embedded in other social, cultural and political processes. For this reason, 
the question of capitalist crisis has to go beyond a purely systemic level of analysis whereby 
the economic level is separated from other dimensions. 
On this basis, five scenarios for looking at the future are discussed. These will form the main 
substance of the paper: varieties of capitalism, systemic crisis of capitalism, catastrophic 
collapse, low growth capitalism, post-capitalism. In conclusion, it is argued that there are 
various possibilities that can be understood in terms of transitions, breakdown, or 
transformation, but a likely future trend will be that capitalist accumulation will be curtailed 
and that there are limits to the accumulation of capital. 
 
Defining Capitalism 
Definitions of capitalism have varied greatly since the advent of the term in the late 
nineteenth century. The Communist Manifesto in 1848 used the term the ‘bourgeois mode of 
production’ and ‘modern bourgeois society’, not capitalism. Marx later wrote of the 
‘capitalist era’ and the capitalist ‘mode of production’ to refer to the emerging shape of the 
modern economy and of societal transformation more generally. When the term capitalism 
came into common currency in the twentieth century, its use revealed a political perspective 
on the desirability and permanence of capitalism as opposed to socialism. Marxist influenced 
approaches saw capitalism as a pervasive social and economic condition that would come to 
an end one day, while the defenders of capitalism preferred to see the modern economy in 
terms of free enterprise or the free market as part of a wider condition of liberty. In many 
sociological accounts, as in the writings of Raymond Aron (1968), the notion of industrial 
society was the preferred term to capitalism. Any prognosis of the future of capitalism will 
need to establish clarity on what it means and what are its core elements. This is not just 
about a narrow preoccupation with definitions, but of agreement on some of the defining 
feature of capitalism and, I argue, critically, whether capitalism refers to the modern economy 
per se or to society.  
The general tendency in modern sociological theory is to see the economy as a subsystem of 
modern society, which, while not reducible to the economy, is very much shaped by it. This 
is most evident in Parsons and the functionalist traditions where the emphasis is placed on the 
economy as the market. For Weber, in contrast, capitalism is an expression of more general 
trends in rationalisation which culminate in the societal condition of an ‘iron cage’ of 
universal rationalism. Nonetheless, despite their differences, for these classical theories 
capitalism is a modern society and based on the centrality of markets. This is also the case 
with Polanyi in this account of the ‘Great Transformation’ that saw markets becoming 
disembedded from traditional social institutions. I believe Marx’s original insight is still 
valid, namely that the modern capitalist economy is more than a market; it is primarily a 
system of production that has a determining effect over the rest of society and, as a mode of 
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production, it became the dominant one since the sixteenth century, making possible the 
modern capitalist era. Nevertheless in the Marxist analysis, the status of the wider category of 
society is unclear and confusingly, as Williams (1976: 50-2) noted, is sometimes ‘bourgeois 
society’ but also incorporates the capitalist mode of production. In all these classical 
accounts, including the seminal contributions of Simmel, Sombart and Schumpeter, the term 
capitalism is highly ambiguous. Either it is a term to refer to modern western society as a 
whole or a term to refer to the modern economy or a part of it.  
Clearly Marx’s legacy is to see modern society increasingly shaped by the capitalist economy 
which has transformed social relations through the progressive extension of exchange values 
into all social spheres. Thus for Marx capitalism refers to more than the economy but to a 
kind of society, a social formation. Marx’s  account sees capitalism as an economic system, a 
mode of production that is based on the labour market and the unrelenting pursuit of profit, 
which is privately appropriated. The strength of the Marx’s approach is that capitalism is a 
dynamic and destructive system that has created self-perpetuating forces that seeks the 
maximisation of profit and the conversion of everything into exchange values. Capitalism is 
an insatiable system of production and valorisation that makes everything transferable into 
commodified forms that serve the accumulation of capital. The notion of Capital is thus the 
primary condition of capitalism and can be seen as a condition or force that is neither entirely 
economic nor just only social. In this respect, the core insight of Marx remains relevant, 
namely that capitalism is based on the accumulation of Capital. We can add to this that while 
not necessarily a necessary feature of capitalism, it has been a destructive force in the world 
in both the positive (removing the vestiges of feudalism) and negative senses of the term. The 
violent history of capitalism over nature and social life has dominated. 
Now, while the analytical basis of this account in Marx resides in the Labour Theory of 
Value, which holds that the potential for production is greater than what the worker gets as a 
wage, the history of capitalism reveals a more complicated story than one that essentially is 
based on an account of the exploitative buying of formally free labour for the production of 
commodities. As Schumpeter and the Frankfurt School theorists argued, the result of the 
buying and selling of labour does not lead inexorably to the immiseration of the proletariat. 
Indeed, the opposite has often been the case and which accounts for the relative success of 
capitalism in warding off political challenges that come from deprivation and exploitation. 
The history of the modern class system and social inequalities, in any case, can no longer be 
seen only in terms of nationally delineated societies where production and consumption 
coincide. Today, these are part of a global system that began with imperialism, as Wallerstein 
(2010) has argued. For Marx, Capital – the logic of accumulation and appropriation – is more 
important than capitalism as an economic system based on wage labour and the class system.  
Conceiving capitalism in terms of the destructive logic of the accumulation of Capital goes 
some way to answering the problem of what is capitalism and whether it is an economic 
system or another term for modern society. The upshot is that capitalism is a system of social 
relations that has commodifying effects. These social relations are not confined to the relation 
between workers and capitalists or relations confined to the economic system but pervade the 
social and political forms of society.  
 
Capitalism and Modernity: Is Capitalism the Defining Feature of Our Time? 
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So far the conclusion is that capitalism cannot be seen as residing in a specific sphere such as 
the economy and is therefore not reducible to the modern economy or market. It also has a 
wider cultural significance, which for Arnason (2016) has a civilisational dimension to it. 
Since Weber, Simmel and Schumpeter through the Frankfurt School to Jameson, capitalism 
has been theorised as having a cultural logic that brings it out of the economic domain. For 
Weber, capitalism ‘is the most fateful force in our modern life’ (Weber [1920] 1978: 17). It is 
driven by a ‘spirit’ that has come to shape the modern world in ways that go beyond the 
economic foundations of capitalism as an economic system. Marcuse (1964) argued 
capitalism had become the ideology of a one-dimensional society that could no longer 
conceive of an alternative. As Boltanski and Chiapello (2006) have shown, the spirit of 
capitalism is itself not immutable, but changes over time and that capitalism will always find 
a spirit to provide it with justifications and motivations (see also Konigns 2015). What 
conclusion can we draw from this? Is contemporary society defined by some kind of spirit of 
capitalism that goes beyond the realm of economic activity to encompass the fabric of 
society? Has the global diffusion of capitalism over the past century to become more or less 
the only economic system in the world, led to its final triumph over history? 
If this is the case and capitalism is the only game in town, it is very difficult to conceive of 
the end of capitalism. However, if capitalism is seen as part of modernity, rather than the 
primary condition of modernity, a different perspective is opened up. For this to be a viable 
position, the distinction between society and economy must be upheld. Capitalist 
accumulation may be the primary form of the modern economy – as both a mode of 
production, a market system and forms of consumption  – but the social is not only defined 
by economic forces, however dominant they are. We must not lose sight of the fact, 
recognised by Marx, Weber and Schumpeter, that capitalism seeks to satisfy human needs 
and in doing so, as Marcuse argued, it creates new needs, which are met by the culture 
industry. Baudrillard (1981) brought this further with the argument that in the end there are 
no needs or use values that exist outside the capitalistic system of exchange values. In any 
case, in so far as it is part of, what Hegel called the ‘system of needs’, it is inextricably tied to 
forces that go beyond its institutional forms. In almost every account of the rise of capitalism, 
there is a general recognition that capitalism as an economic form cannot be separated from 
wider societal processes.  
Polanyi’s account, while flawed in many ways, shows how the formation of capitalism 
occurred through the disembedding of markets from established social and cultural 
institutions which consisted of largely segmented markets (Polanyi [1944] ). The self-
regulating market that gained victory in the nineteenth century around the competitive labour 
market, the gold standard, and international free trade, was unable to sustain itself. Aside 
from requiring an interventionist state to enable it to gain dominance, it provoked a counter-
movement by the end of the century. For Polanyi, capitalist societies entail a ‘double 
movement’ around disembedding and embedding. Thus, socialism and its various offshoots, 
including the Chartist movements, trade unionism, social democracy  etc, seek to subordinate 
the economy to democracy. This dialectical view of modern society was also the basis of 
Marx’s theory of class conflict as an integral part of capitalism.  
Theories of modernity vary greatly depending on the weight given to its economic, political 
or cultural currents. This is not the place to survey these debates (see Wagner, 2012). In the 
present context the key question is the significance of capitalism, as the main form of 
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economic modernity, in relation to other currents, of which democracy is of particular 
importance. While it cannot be said to be the final word on modernity, one of its major 
expressions has been in the conflict between capitalism and democracy. It is possible, 
following Castoriadis (1989), to see both of these as expressions of imaginary significations 
that, as argued by Arnason (1991, 2003), produce civilizational configurations. Theorists of 
modernity have drawn attention to many features of the condition of modernity and there is 
little consensus on what it entails other than that it takes a variety of forms. There is, 
however, agreement that modernity is not reducible to capitalism and wider processes of 
instrumental rationality, as in the writings of Weber and the Frankfurt School, and that it also 
takes other political and cultural forms. Of these democracy is possibly the most important as 
the concrete and long lasting legacy of modernity. This is not to neglect the fact that there 
have been major experiments with modernity that were not primarily products of democracy 
or even of capitalism, as the twentieth century history of Soviet communism attests (Arnason 
1993) and not forgetting the shorter lived fascist experiments. While the history of modern 
societies bears testimony to many different trajectories of modernity, there can be no doubt 
that in the present day the two most fateful forces are those of capitalism and democracy. It is 
possible to view these forces in more general terms, as in the social theory of Habermas for 
whom modernity is essentially a struggle between instrumental rationality and 
communicative rationality or a conflict between system and life world (Habermas, 1984 and 
1987). Touraine (1995) offered a similar framework in terms of a conflict at the heart of 
modernity between Reason and the Subject (see also Touraine, 2014). In this way as the 
destructive forces of capitalism colonise the social world they meet with resistance drawn 
from other currents in modernity. As Wagner (2012: 81-106) has argued, democracy sits in a 
relation of tension with capitalism, but in many of its forms – as for example ‘democratic 
capitalism’ in the post 1945 period  in western societies  – it has also accommodated 
capitalism by reducing its potential challenges around equality and inclusion. However, in 
line with this argument and Marx’s own vision of the future, capitalism does not remove 
opposing forces but in fact increases the scale of counter-currents. Therein resides the sources 
of its demise. 
While a definitive answer to the question whether capitalism is the defining feature of our 
time is probably impossible, the argument given in this article is that whatever the answer, 
consideration must be given to the field of tensions in which capitalism operates. It was 
argued in the foregoing that capitalism cannot be seen as entirely encased within the 
economic sphere of society and, as the legacy of Marx shows, is embedded in social relations 
and produces systemic crises that have the effect of constantly transforming the social fabric 
of societies. Capitalism meets with resistance and thus is inextricably bound up with political 
modernity, of which, as argued, democracy is one of the most significance forms.  
Since the early 1980s when neoliberalism entered mainstream politics, it gained ideological 
supremacy in many parts of the world and could be said to be the dominant ideology of 
contemporary societies. The celebration of homo economicus – as embraced by 
postcommunist regimes, right-wing governments in Latin America in the 1980s, the PRC – 
can indeed be viewed as the final victory of capitalism. However, the theoretical perspective 
offered here – influenced by the diverse approaches of Castoriadis, Touraine, Polanyi and 
Habermas – would see capitalist ideology, such as the neoliberal doctrine of the free market, 
as entangled in counter-vailing forces. Democracy – in the wide sense of popular movements 
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for social justice – remains a powerful force in the world, often resisting capitalism, but too 
supporting capitalism and in many cases being co-opted by capitalism, as Nancy Fraser 
(2013) has argued. Democracy and capitalism have existed in various degrees of tension, 
ranging from co-existence – as in democratic capitalism or liberal democracy – to outright 
antagonism, as in anti-capitalist protest movements (Bowles and Gintis, 1986). More or less 
every democracy (letting aside premodern forms of democracy) has been capitalist. The 
confluence of both can be accounted for by the fact that democracies require wealth creation 
and capitalism has been able to deliver enough for many democracies to thrive and settle with 
capitalism. While capitalist societies – China and Chile under Pinochet – do not have to be 
democracies, they cannot entirely eliminate the quest for democracy.  
 A tentative answer to the question, then, whether capitalism is the defining feature of our 
time must take into account the fact that capitalism exists in a state of perpetual crisis as it 
collides with other social processes. As David Harvey (2010), following Marx, has shown, 
capitalism is not a static system but produces on-going crises. The history of capitalism is a 
story of one crisis leading to the next. This is because of its tendency towards violent 
destruction, beginning with the destruction of nature. By placing capitalist crisis at the centre 
of the analysis, it can be shown that in a longer historical perspective – at least form the 
perspective of western societies  –  there were four major moments of crisis in modern 
society when capitalism and democracy collided leading to new societal configurations and 
paradoxical outcomes for democracy.  These moments, briefly characterised, are: the crisis of 
the 1870s, which saw the first crisis of economic liberalism leading to the rise of the 
protectionist state; the crisis of 1929 and the Great Depression which finally saw the 
emergence of Keynesianism since 1945; the crisis of 1973 which saw the crisis of preceding 
era of ‘democratic capitalism’ and the rise of neoliberalism; the crisis of 2008 in which the 
neoliberal order imploded but with uncertain outcomes. Since the crisis of 2007/8 a 
fundamental shift in perspective is needed, since it is now apparent that there are major 
contradictions and paradoxes in the relationship between capitalism and democracy. The 
former has undermined the latter. The shock of Brexit and Trump has deepened this sense of 
crisis, which cannot be seen either as the victory of capitalism or democracy.  
 
An intermediate  conclusion is that the present time is characterised by a deep uncertainty as 
to the future. This mood of uncertainty is probably more a defining condition of our time than 
the ideology of homo economicus. The quest for social justice and for meaningful forms of 
democratic empowerment are not silenced. While democracy is constantly thwarted by big 
business and the apparent penetration of capitalism into human subjectivity invalidates some 
of the presumptions of humanist Marxism, the moral and political horizons of societies can 
never be entirely closed. In view of these considerations, the question of the future of 
capitalism can now be addressed.  
 
Five Scenarios of the Future of Capitalism 
The first and most general point is that it is now more clear than ever that there is no single 
trajectory for capitalism. Economies do not progress along linear paths. Although Marx in 
earlier writings referred to a succession of modes of production, his mature thought, as 
reflected in, for example the Marx-Zasulich correspondence, revealed a more nuanced view 
of nonEuropean trajectories of capitalism.  While the received Marxist view that capitalism 
will come to an end simply because all modes of production come to an end, can be criticised 
from such a perspective, it should be noted that Marx himself saw a postcapitalist society as 
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arriving quite far into the future, which is presumably why he distinguished between 
socialism and – a more distant in the future  - communism  It is now widely accepted that 
slavery did not end with the demise of the ancient modes of production but was perpetuated 
by modernity and by capitalism and today takes new and incipient forms. Capitalism existed 
prior to the modern capitalist economy and is unlikely simply to vanish in the near future. 
There is also no reason to suppose that a post-capitalist society will be more desirable or 
democratic. The future is likely to consist of a variety of societal forms. However, in such a 
variegated world it is possible that the dominant forms of capitalism that until now have 
prevailed will be much diminished. A second general point can also be stated: just as 
economic orders will not evolve linearly, so too will political orders likely take a variety of 
shapes and forms. Today the most obvious example is China where capitalism coexists with 
the one-party state, which nominally subscribes to communism. While this offers a clear 
refutation of the end of history thesis, the world-wide diffusion of democracy does not 
necessarily lead to the triumph of liberal democracy. Democracy, too, exists in a variety of 
forms (Blokker, 2012). A striking recent development is the consolidation of authoritarian 
democracy in many parts of the world. This brings me to the first and most likely scenario of 
the future of democracy.  
 
1). Varieties of Capitalism   
The debate about the future of capitalism and its possible collapse has been predicated on the 
presumption that capitalism takes one major form and that there is one direction of travel 
leading to its final collapse. This position takes almost no account of one of the most 
influential sociological approaches to the study of contemporary capitalism, namely the 
‘varieties of capitalism’ approach (VoC). While Marx provided a robust theory of capitalism, 
the Marxist approach has not given sufficient attention to the fact that capitalism is highly 
variable as an institutional form. Indeed, the huge differences in capitalism have led to many 
theorists rejecting the label capitalism.  
According to Hall and Suskice (2001), in the most well-known account of the VoC argument, 
capitalist regimes vary greatly. The critical factor for them is the ways in which capitalist 
firms coordinate actions and the degree of institutional advantage they secure from state 
policies. They distinguish between two major types of capitalism, liberal market economies 
and coordinated market economies, with the latter more dependent on non-market 
relationships of production than the former which depend more on competitive markets. The 
upshot of the VoC approach is that capitalism differs greatly in national contexts due 
institutional advantages that national states offer. The theory suggests that globalisation as a 
monolithic one-directional trajectory of universal de-regulation is less pervasive in that firms 
will not automatically offshore when it may be cheaper to do so. Nations can prosper not by 
adopting neo-liberal policies but by building on institutional advantages. This perspective 
offers a view on the significant differences between Scandinavian and German experiences, 
on the one side, and the more liberal models in English speaking world. Other contributions 
to this debate include Albert’s (1993) contrast of Anglo-Saxon and German, or ‘Rhenan’ 
capitalism.  
While the main contrast in the VoC literature are the differences between neoliberal oriented 
economies and the European model of what has been referred to as social capitalism (see 
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Offe, 2006), a wider conception of varieties of capitalism would need to take into account the 
quite significant differences in neoliberalism, which is not a single monolithic force. The UK 
and the USA are often taken to be the major examples, but here the differences are very great 
as are differences between Anglo-Saxon models and those that have emerged in the 
developing world, where neoliberalism has been arguably more pervasive and where 
democratisation is weaker (Connell and Dados, 2014). 
While the VoC debate has mostly been confined to the OECD countries and micro level 
analyses of the relationship between firms and state structures, it leaves open the wider global 
context. Amable (2004), for instance, identified five global forms of capitalism. The future of 
capitalism cannot be separated from the question of its forms and the diverse ways it interacts 
with states. Some forms may perish while other types may prosper. It may indeed be the case 
that the collapse of states will lead to the collapse of the kinds of capitalism that they foster 
and not due to the inherent problems of capitalism. There is almost no significant instance of 
capitalist economy that is not tied to the state to support it. Without such a support, capitalism 
is vulnerable. 
One major trend world-wide is export-led industrialisation, especially in Asian countries that 
have been transformed by the retail revolution in Europe and North America. Hamilton and 
Shin (2015) question the model of capitalism that Marx provided for East Asian countries. 
This was an analysis that was based on factory production and on the relations between 
owners and workers that was centred in European national economies. The resulting bias 
towards production and nationally delineated economies does not accommodate demand-
responsive economies in most developing countries. While they do not speak of an Asian 
variety of capitalism, they stress the need to see capitalism in a variety of world contexts, but 
where there are significant global interconnection that establish links with between centres of 
production and the main sites of consumption. 
Looking at capitalism as variegated, it may be objected, does not provide an answer to the 
question of what its basic form takes. Obviously if something exists in a variety of forms, 
there must be a common denominator that has undergone variation. TheVoC approach does 
not clarify exactly what is capitalism. Moreover, as the above suggests, the different forms of 
capitalism are connected through global processes. Thus, while the varieties of capitalism 
may be very different, they are all interdependent (as is illustrated in the trade war between 
the US and China). So, it is not a question of a numerical order of different types that exist on 
their own. Demand for goods in Europe and North America drives industrial production in 
Asia. As Weber ([1927] 2003) wrote in his General Economic History, the history of 
capitalism itself reveals a variety of forms (see also Kocka 2016). The VofC approach is an 
essential corrective of simplistic models of a unitary model of capitalism progressing towards 
a bright future or those that see it heading for the precipice. A very likely trend is that 
capitalism will morph into a variety of shapes and forms and that some will survive. It may 
indeed be the case that Asian models will continue to undergo transformation, especially as 
democratisation in those countries deepens. So, this is in effect a scenario that sees a future 
for capitalism, though not necessarily a long-term one, since the varieties that survive will 
probably do so as long as the capitalist world system is in existence. 
 
2). Systemic crisis of capitalism 
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Another scenario of the future of capitalism is that it does not have a future. It will simply 
come to an end. In line with Marx’s prognoses of the future of capitalism due to its inherent 
self-destructiviness, several theorists have offered new interpretations of the end of 
capitalism. It is the internal contradictions of capitalism that will bring about its end, and not 
an external force or the appeal of an alternative economic system. For Marx, it was the falling 
rate of profit leading to a reduced capacity for growth. Other contradictions included 
improved technology leading to the over-production of goods that are worth less; the over-
supply of credit, which, in combination with technology replacing human labour, leads to 
goods being produced that do not have enough people who can afford to buy them.  
The global financial crisis of 2008/9 marked a new moment of crisis in the history of 
capitalism and gave a renewed significance to Marx’s theory of capitalism over others, such 
as Weber’s or the neoliberal narrative of the triumph of the market. The Weberian legacy – 
despite in many ways complementing Marx’s analysis of capitalism – ultimately had a 
different story to tell, namely that capitalism will always find ways to solve its problems. 
Through calculation, planning and rational mastery, capitalism contains within itself solutions 
to the problems it brings to the modern world. Systemic crises that might engender the 
demise of capitalism had no place in this approach. The prospect of a systemic crisis of 
capitalism is also foreign to neo-liberal theory and its canonical doctrine that markets operate 
through self-correcting pricing mechanisms. Contrary to the Weberian and Marxist positions, 
according to F. A Hayek, any attempt to plan the economy would more likely lead to break-
down, since prices – the basis of markets – operate in a context of risk and contingency.  
A major work co-authored by Wallerstein and other prominent sociologists has accessed the 
prospects of capitalism coming to an end in a not too distant future (Wallerstein et al 2013). 
Wallerstein and Randall Collins in their respective accounts portray capitalism entering into 
turmoil followed by decline. Collins’s argument is more specific and can best summed up 
first: the process of technological displacement of labour, in particular middle class labour, 
will in the long-run generate the terminal crisis of capitalism. The various solutions or 
escapes that capitalism had until now are becoming rapidly closed off. For example, the 
computerisation of jobs, led to new jobs but now these are also disappearing and not being 
compensated by the creation of a sufficient number of new ones.  
Wallerstein in a far-reaching analysis of the demise of capitalism claims that the capitalist 
world-system that consolidated over the past five centuries or so will come to an end as do all 
economic and political systems. His main argument, which is based on the so-call 
Kondratieff cycles, is that capitalism goes through roughly fifty year periods of boon and 
slump and that the slumps are getting worse. This is a reversal of the neo-liberal narrative that 
the booms bring about greater prosperity than the slumps. Capitalism is entering a new 
systemic crisis in which profits are plummeting. His argument runs against the varieties of 
capitalism perspective in that for him capitalism is organised on a world level and is not 
locked into national or even into regional variants. If this were the case, it is conceivably 
possible for systemic crises to be contained in the way, for example, that the EU has tried to 
contain the problem of Greek debt. However, there are also hegemonic crises, which are 
longer than the fifty year Kondratieff cycles, and occur in the transition from one hegemonic 
order to the next. The decline of the United States as the main hegemonic order brings with it 
a new crisis. 
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Capitalism is driven by the relentless accumulation of capital. The maximisation of capital 
requires a hegemonic order that imposes order on the world so that it is not hindered. States 
outside the hegemonic order benefit from the existence of a hegemonic power to the extent 
that they benefit from capitalism. In his analysis, the basic costs of production are rising and 
the capitalism system as a whole cannot be brought back to equilibrium in that the 
mechanisms it relied on until now are not available. For these reasons, the possibilities for an 
endless accumulation of capital are declining. The demise of capitalism is accompanied by a 
situation in which large numbers of people no longer believe that they are benefiting from 
capitalism. ‘We are consequently living in a structural crisis in which there is a struggle about 
the successor system’ (Wallerstein in Wallerstein et al, 2013: 35). 
Wallerstein’s prognosis of a deep structural crisis rests on a theory of capitalism that sees the 
core characteristic of capitalism to be the accumulation of capital. In effect, it is a theory of 
the systemic crisis of capital accumulation. It does not rule out the survival of capitalism on a 
more reduced scale and thus of the fourth and fifth scenarios discussed below. However, his 
notion of a historical systemic crisis describes the ending of one societal system and the 
transition to another. It is not clear what might come after the present crisis, which may 
continue for perpetuity. From a more critical perspective, there is a question to be asked 
whether current developments are indicative of a systemic crisis that portends the end of 
capitalism. The so-called crisis of capitalism in 2008/9 turned out in many ways to be a crisis 
of the state. The rise of austerity policies have not endangered capitalism, which recovered 
remarkably from the financial crisis. Streeck (2014) is undoubtedly correct in describing the 
current crisis as one of the relationship between capitalism and democracy. However, the 
crisis of democratic capitalism or in the terms of Habermas (1976), a legitimation crisis, does 
not necessarily signal a terminal crisis of capitalism. It is essentially a political crisis and may 
take the form of a crisis of governability. The notion of a systemic crisis, on the other hand, is 
an economic crisis that unfolds in the long-term. Such a prognosis might then be seen as 
compatible with other views that focus on the short-term (including the VoC approach). 
However, the problem with purely systemic accounts of crisis is that they do not adequately 
address other dimensions of crisis, such as the uncoupling of democracy from capitalism, 
new expressions of populism or mass mobilization against the super-rich. 
 
3). Catastrophic Collapse  
The notion of a systemic crisis of capitalism is based on a view of the internal dynamics of 
the capitalist economy leading in time to the end of capitalism. An alternative scenario can be 
briefly considered, namely the possibility of global catastrophe. The most obvious possibility 
is an ecological crisis resulting from severe climatic change. Such an occurrence would not 
be entirely an external cause, since capitalism has been one of the major causes of climate 
change and, as Marx recognised, economic activity is embedded in nature (see Moore 2016). 
However, ecological catastrophe is not in itself a systemic crisis, as normally understood, but 
a crisis in the relation of human societies with the planet.  
Other possible catastrophic crises that might lead to the collapse of capitalism are biological, 
for example the global spread of a deadly virus, or nuclear war. It should be recalled that the 
world’s single greatest catastrophe was the Spanish Flu that killed between 50 to 100  million 
people in 1918 /19. While this did not endanger capitalism as such, it had huge economic and 
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more importantly political consequences, for example between 13 to 18 million people died 
in India as a result of the flu. It paved the way to independence of India and to the world-wide  
creation of healthcare systems (see Spinney 2018). While these developments can also be 
seen as functional to the long-term requirements of capitalism, they nonetheless had the 
potential to be catastrophic for all societal systems. The twentieth century was fundamentally 
changed as a result of the epidemic and it is therefore possible to imagine how a future 
epidemic, made possible by an even more interconnected world, would have similar 
consequences.  
Now, while none of these catastrophes can be excluded in principle it is difficult to see how 
worst case scenarios of climate change – for example global increase in temperature of 2 to 4 
degrees – will lead to the collapse of capitalism. Such events would be catastrophic for many 
parts of the world leading to major displacement of populations and rises in sea –levels would 
affect most parts so the world and possibly lead to the collapse of some states. However, it is 
not evident that capitalism would collapse unless a much longer term of 50 to 100 years were 
taken when ecological crisis may be reach a level that endangers human societies. Until then, 
ecological catastrophe is likely to contribute to the long-term systemic crisis of capitalism 
rather than be in itself the transformative force. As Frederic Jameson remarked in a much 
cited phrase ‘it is easier to imagine the end of the world than to imagine the end of 
capitalism’ (Jameson, 2003: 76). 
 
4). Low Growth Capitalism   
Another scenario that is possibly a more realistic prognosis, at least for the short to medium 
term of the next twenty to thirty years, is a long period of low growth capitalism bolstered 
either by an enhanced regulatory order or constrained neoliberal regimes. Predictions of the 
collapse of capitalism tend to be either premature or long-term. As noted, Marx himself saw 
it as an event in the distant future. The foreseeable future, based on current trends, is more 
likely to be one of the continued transformation of neoliberalism but within the limits of low 
growth, if not stagnation. Predictions of the end of capitalism neglect the fact that capitalism 
is highly resilient. It is capable of considerable flexibility and the fact that it is crisis prone 
does not mean that a crisis portends its demise. Rather than one big crisis that will bring 
about the end of capitalism, there is a series of crises and the resolution of one generates 
another. Crises can in fact be a necessary part of capitalism. 
As Harvey and others have argued, the need for capitalism to find new sources of capital led 
to the extension of easy credit to the working class until it led to the crisis of private debt  
which imploded in 2008 with the subprime mortgage crisis in the USA after reaching 
unsustainable levels. Thus, in Harvey’s words, ‘crisis tendencies are not resolved but moved 
around.’ Crises also function as ‘irrational rationalisers’ of a system that is inherently 
contradictory. ‘Crises are, in short, as necessary to the evolution of capitalism as money, 
labour, power and capital itself’ (Harvey, 2010: 117). David Kotz (2017) argues that if 
neoliberal accumulation continues it will lead to a future of stagnation and instability. This 
situation is vividly apparent with the election of Trump and Brexit. Both events in 2016 can 
be seen as the expression of stagnant economies that saw a fall in the real value of wages and 
declining opportunities and quality of life for many low income people. The political 
outcomes with the Trump presidency and Brexit lead in turn to political instability. But 
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neoliberal capitalism, despite some modifications, is basically in place. ProBrexit politicians 
in the UK thus seek to free the UK from the regulatory structure of European integration in 
order to make the UK a global free trading nation even if in the short-term there will be 
economic havoc and social mayhem since, from their perspective, an unfettered capitalism 
will triumph in the long-run. 
The reality of neoliberal capitalism is that it can readily adapt to changing circumstances. 
While neoliberalism has lost much of its ideological zeal, its policy consequences are with us 
(Crouch 2011). Many governments reply on neoliberal policies in some form or another. Low 
or zero growth economies will lead to increased unemployment that will be eased only by the 
rise of low paid temporary and insecure forms of employment (Doogan 2009; Sennett, 2006). 
Meanwhile the super-rich will retain their privileges and global inequality will not decline 
significantly. The reality of capitalism today, according to Thomas Pickety (2014: 571), is a 
great contradiction created by the fact that wealth accumulated in the past grows more rapidly 
than wages and output. It has led the entrepreneur to become a rentier. His analysis shows 
that the accumulation of wealth has led to divergence in equality, but ‘divergence is not 
perpetual and it is only one of several possible future directions for the distribution of wealth’ 
(p. 27).  This conclusion is less apocalyptic than Marx’s who predicted zero growth in the 
long-run. Capitalism can flip the other way leading to greater, not less, regulatory control as 
reflected in the example of European integration as a stabilizing mechanism to restrain the 
worse effects of capitalism but without endangering capitalism. 
So, a possible future is the continuation of neoliberalism but with increased political 
instability arising from the on-set of low growth. This, however, may be vary greatly 
throughout the world. The western world is clearly witnessing low growth, but this is not 
necessarily the case worldwide. While Brazil is in the throes of economic stagnation, this is 
not the case for India and East Asia. Yet, as these countries become richer, it is likely 
according to Mann (2013: 97) that global economic growth will slow down due to wider 
distribution of wealth. The resulting higher costs of labour everywhere will lead to lower 
profits.  Mann disagrees with the notion of a systemic crisis simply on the grounds that 
societies are not systems but multiple overlapping networks of ideological, economic, 
military and political networks of interaction. The lines of interaction are not systemic and 
internal dynamics are not self-contained within a domain such as the economy. This leads 
him to being more sceptical of a terminal crisis of capitalism. His prognosis is instead for a 
lower-growth capitalism that reduces global inequality and consequently reduces the prospect 
of social revolution. The major world revolutionary movements in the world in recent times 
that have brought about change are religious ones and do not have specific implications for 
capitalism. 
 
5.) Post-capitalism   
It is possible to envisage a future in which capitalism – weakened as a result of systemic 
crises – co-exists with non-capitalist forms of economic organisation. We can call this order 
‘post-capitalism’ to capture the sense of continuity, but also with some significant points of 
rupture and counter-trends. So, post-capitalism as a term does not designate a condition that 
is non-capitalist, but only partly capitalist. For the immediate future, for reasons given above, 
it is difficult to envisage a whole-scale transition to a socialist society or some kind of non-
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capitalist society. The political forces that might create it are absent.  Future trends are more 
likely to lead in the direction of a post-capitalist world in which capitalism wanes but does 
not disappear. Capitalist accumulation may reach its limits for reasons of systemic 
contradictions but does not undergo a systemic collapse. This vision was set out by Drucker 
(1994), for whom the future that beckoned was essentially a post-capitalist one in so far as 
the new economy is a knowledge based one and thus supplants the proletarian based 
capitalism of industrial capitalism. However, his claims of a technologically driven post-
capitalist order do not stand up to much scrutiny, since the reality of the knowledge economy 
is that it exists within the capitalist mode of production. Nonetheless, technological change 
could possibly lead the way to a post-capitalist society if it were accompanied by major 
political transformation that made possible the eradication of many of the problems produced 
by capitalism.  
What if Schumpeter were right? According to Schumpeter, creative destruction, does not 
mean the end of capitalism but its transformation. While Marx saw the destructiveness of 
capitalism mostly in negative terms and as the expression of the demise of capitalism, 
Schumpeter saw destructiveness as potentially creative. Indeed, the history of capitalism 
bears Schumpeter out to a considerable degree in that major technological innovations have 
led to the renewal of capitalism. As Beckert argues ‘capitalism is an economic system 
oriented towards the future’ (2016: 269). It will not be easily defeated by the future. Paul 
Mason (2017) argues that postcapitalism is a realistic possibility because of major changes 
brought about by technology. Technology has reduced the need for work. Automation will 
improve the quality of life for all. There is a remarkable rise of the shared economy, that is 
goods and services that do not depend on the rule of the market and manageralism  (see 
Elder-Vas, 2016 and 2018).  This position is at odds with Collins’s argument discussed 
above. However, technology alone does not determine the future. It is also a question of how 
such changes interact with other developments. As argued, capitalism is embedded in social 
institutions, cultural practices and normative orders, which may generate counter-currents to 
capitalism. 
In the context of, on the one side, the systemic weakening of capitalism and the resulting 
decline in capitalist accumulation, and, on the other, the reassertion of the democratic 
constitutional state, the field of tensions that has always defined modernity is once again 
reconfiguring. Calls for neo-Keynesianism, as in the writing of Joseph Stigliz and Paul 
Krugman, for example, have led to considerable rethinking of the merits of neo-liberalism, 
which no longer enjoys hegemonic status (see also Davies 2015). It is possible to envisage a 
world in which other and more democratic kinds of economic organisation develop – for 
example a Universal Basic Income –  and co-exist along-side capitalism, thus setting limits to 
its capacity to shape the world. Such a prospect, again, is more likely if the future is 
envisaged in terms of multiple paths rather than one direction of travel. This is Calhoun’s 
position against Wallerstein’s argument of a systemic crisis of capitalism. ‘Capitalism could 
decline without collapsing, simply organizing less of economic activity as alternative systems 
organize more’ (Calhoun 2013: 159). In this view, capitalism persists but is less dominant 
and in time a new economic system might develop. It is possible to see a variation of this 
argument along the lines of Robert Reich’s claim that capitalism needs to save itself from the 
most destructive forms of neo-liberal super capitalism (Reich 2015, see also 2008). 
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The political impact of climate change in the next decade or so may lead to major changes in 
consumption, which is currently based on the myth of sustainability. It is evident that if 
current consumption continues, the ecological impact will be catastrophic and reduced 
consumption may be the only viable option to turbo-charged growth and super-capitalism. If 
this were to happen, it would lead to reduced capital accumulation and possibly alternative 
forms of social life. It is very likely that in the age of the Anthropocene ecological challenges 
to capitalism will be critical in stemming its destructive tendencies. The likelihood of such a 
development raises once again the question of a new relationship between capitalism and 
democracy, since it is unlikely that capitalism on its own will lead the way. 
 
Conclusion 
Theorising about capitalism and its future has re-animated sociological thought in recent 
years. The bicentenary of Marx’s birth is a fitting occasion to revive the legacy of classical 
social theory on long-term analyses of capitalism and other related major social and historical 
transformations. The analysis given in this paper is that any consideration of the future of 
capitalism will need to clarify a number of points concerning its core elements, since it is not 
possible to speak of capitalism as a single monolithic entity that has a single future. The 
origins of capitalism in the transition from feudalism have been much discussed and we have 
a general picture of the course of capitalism over the past five centuries and of its diffusion 
over the world.  
A challenge for today is to think through the present situation of capitalism. Some of Marx’s 
most important ideas are still relevant, especially concerning the centrality of capitalist 
accumulation. However, the world that took shape in the second half of the previous century 
cannot be understood form the historical experience of the nineteenth. Building on recent 
work by Wallerstein et al, Streeck, Beckert, and others, I have proposed five possible 
scenarios that sum up current debates on the future of capitalism. These can be roughly 
divided into perspectives that emphasis transitions to a future non-capitalist world, to 
breakdown, to transformations of the present. Arguments that emphasis the latter are more 
convincing in that there is not one end but several ends in sight for capitalism. One likely 
future will be that, what Robert Reich (2008), has called super-capitalism will be curtailed 
and there are limits to the accumulation of capital. The end of capitalism is a story about the 
degree to which its destructiveness can be controlled. The analysis offered in this paper 
highlights the links between capitalism and other social and political processes, such as 
democracy, as the points of tension from which crises spring. 
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